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NOTES AND COMMENT
* * * Only where the idea has been reduced to concrete form prior to its dis-
closure to and appropriation by the defendant may recovery be had upon an
implied contract.
This case clarifies the rule laid down in Anderson v. Distler.56
There the court referred to abstract ideas and stated that they could
not be the subject of a property right or a contract. The better rule
is that they may be the subject of a contract as parties may contract
concerning anything that is not illegal or contrary to public policy,
and once the idea is made the subject of a contract, then no matter
how abstract in form it may be, the idea is protected.
V
Much as it is desired to support the originator or inventor of an
idea and create a property right therein, in the face of the definite
stand taken by all the courts, it would be difficult to reverse them-
selves and create a property right where they claim none existed. A
careful analysis of the decisions shows two common elements. The
originator may protect himself by an express contract. No property
right or implied contract will be recognized. Naturally, obtaining
an express contract is not a simple procedure, as most people wish
to know something about which they contract. Also, the court will
only enforce the contract if it is definite and not merely an agreement
to agree, which is unenforceable.5 7 Because of the difficulties sur-
rounding the creation of a contract, the best remedy to protect the
author of an idea is by legislative enactment creating a property right
in ideas. The definition of "property" is general enough 1; so that
ideas can be classified as intangible, incorporeal property and, as
such, subject to protection as any other personal property.
ROBERT M. POST.
CORPORATION STOcK REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS; MUTUALITY OF
OBLIGATION AND ILLUSORY PROMISES
A corporation, subject to the provisions of its charter and by-
laws, has the inherent power to purchase its own stock.1 Such power
56 See note 39, supra.
57 See note 41, supra.
58 See note 31, supra.
1 West Penn. Chemical and Mfg. Co. v. Prentice, 236 Fed. 891 (C. C. A.
3d, 1916); Verplanck v. Ins. Co., 11 Edw. Ch. 84 (N. Y. 1831); City Bank of
Columbus v. Bruce and Fox, 17 N. Y. 510 (1858); Laue v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 243 App. Div. 57, 276 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dept. 1934).
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if unlimited may prove dangerous to both stockholders and creditors.
Therefore, even at common law the power was not absolute. For ex-
ample, if the capital of a corporation was impaired the contract would
not be enforced. 2 The policy is to preserve the capital of the corpora-
tion which is deemed to be held in trust for benefit of creditors.3
Therefore, where no creditors or adverse interests existed, the corpo-
ration could repurchase regardless of its financial condition. This
seems to be the law today notwithstanding statutes.4
The common law to a great extent still governs, for the New
York Stock Corporation Law, unlike that of other states, contains
no provisions regulating the repurchase of a corporation's own stock. 5
However, Section 664 6 of the New York Penal Law, relating to the
misconduct of officers and directors of stock corporations, and the
court's interpretation 7 thereof have fulfilled the need. The policy re-
mains the same and a corporation may repurchase its own stock to-
day, provided the purchase is paid for from surplus.8 Since the cor-
poration may repurchase its stock it is of course not illegal for the
corporation to contract to do so. Although the corporation need not
have a surplus at the time the contract is made,9 it must have a sur-
plus at the time of payment or else the contract is unenforceable.' 0
Lack of surplus is a matter of defense and the burden of proof rests
with the corporation."
2 West Penn. Chemical and Mfg. Co. v. Prentice, 236 Fed. 891 (C. C. A.
3d, 1916) ; McIntyre v. E. Bement's Sons, 146 Mich. 74, 109 N. W. 45 (1906) ;
Hoover Steel Ball Co. v. Schaefer Ball Bearing Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 164, 106 Atl.
471 (1919).
3 See note 2, supra.
4 Cross v. Beguelin, 226 App. Div. 349, 235 N. Y. Supp. 336, aff'd o other
grounds, 253 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
5 PRASxxz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF PRIVATE CoRPORA-
TIONS (1937) 353, 354.
6 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 664 ("Misconduct of officers and directors of stock
corporations. A director of a stock corporation, who concurs in any vote or
act of the directors of such corporation, or any of them, by which it is
intended: * * *
"5. To apply any portion of the funds of such corporation, except surplus,
directly or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock,
"Is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
7 Richards v. Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912); Van
Slochem v. Villard, 207 N. Y. 587, 101 N. E. 467 (1913); Laue v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 243 App. Div. 57, 276 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dept. 1934).
8 See note 7, supra; Topken, Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249
N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928); Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann,
258 App. Div. 649, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1st Dept. 1940).
9 City of Columbus v. Bruce and Fox, 17 N. Y. 510 (1858) ; Richards v.
Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912); Strodl v. Farish-
Strafford Co., 145 App. Div. 406, 130 N. Y. Supp. 35 (1st Dept. 1911); Moses
v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203, 118 N: Y. Supp. 410 (1909).
l0 in re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (1914); Richards v. Ernst
Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912).
11 See note 10, supra.
.254 [ VOL. 15
NOTES AND COMMENT
I
In New York the problem has arisen in regard to what is suffi-
cient consideration on the part of the corporation for such a repur-
chase agreement. It has been held that employment of the seller by
the corporation is sufficient consideration. 12 Also a repurchase agree-
ment arising out of the original transaction of sale, whose repurchase
clause will become effective upon the happening of certain contin-
gencies, has been upheld on the ground that the original consideration
supporting the contract of sale supported the contract of repurchase. 13
However, the promise by the corporation to repurchase, standing
alone, has been held to be insufficient consideration. The decision was
rendered by the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Topken,
Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz.14 The corporation agreed
with its employee that it would purchase and the employee agreed
to sell any shares of stock of the corporation that he might have at
the termination of his employment. The corporation sued for specific
performance but the court in denying it held that the corporation's
promise to purchase was illusory, for it could only be enforced if it
had a surplus at the time of payment. Section 664 of the New York
Penal Law would render illegal a payment out of capital. The prom-
ise might or might not be binding on the corporation and hence, not
being mutually binding, lacked consideration.
It should be recognized that the greater part of the court's de-
cision is dicta. There was sufficient ground for denying specific per-
formance without holding that there was no mutuality of obligation
and no contract at all. The corporation tendered no money for the
stock, claiming the stock had no book value which was to determine
the price. Since it would be inequitable to order the transfer of the
certificates for nothing, specific performance was properly denied.
But this does not necessarily prove that there was no contract at
law. "Lack of mutuality, as the phrase is used by courts of equity,
is not necessarily any objection to the existence of a contract." 15
Perhaps what has been labeled lack of mutuality was lack of ade-
quacy of consideration, a doctrine the examination of which the courts
have many times evaded merely saying inadequacy is no defense.",
Although merely dicta the court's opinion has nevertheless be-
come important for it appears to have been followed in the Appellate
12Richards v. Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912);
Topken, Loring and Schwvartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735(1928).
13 Strodl v. Farish-Strafford Co., 145 App. Div. 406, 130 N. Y. Supp. 35(1st Dept. 1911).
14 This and associated cases are considered in (1929) 3 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 276.
15 Hunt v. Stimson, 23 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; 1 WiLLIsToN,
CONTRACTS § 140.10 (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 178.
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Division.17 Hence an analysis is necessary. The decision seems to
have resulted in the anomaly that a corporation cannot contract on
the basis of a promise, to do in the future what it has a right to do
in the present. This does not further the policy of preserving capital
since the condition concerning payment only out of surplus can oper-
ate in the future 18 as well as in the present. To avoid the restraint
on contracting imposed by the Topken case, other consideration must
be found where it otherwise would be natural to merely rely upon
the corporation's promise. Since the repurchase is the end in view,
the other consideration will usually be of small value. It therefore
seems that the seller would hardly be better protected, for the cor-
poration would still be in a position to avoid the obligation that was
primarily considered, ie., to repurchase. In other words the corpo-
ration would still have a way out, while the other contracting party
gains no compensating benefit in regard to practical values.
In the late case, Greater New York Carpet House v. Hersch-
mann,19 the same defense as in the Topken case was interposed by
the defendant, but the Appellate Division found consideration and
specific performance was granted. The plaintiff corporation and the
defendant's testator and another, sole stockholders of the plaintiff
corporation, arranged d plan whereby the corporation would take out
life insurance policies on the lives of both stockholders payable to the
corporation. The proceeds thereof would be used to purchase the
deceased's stock. The purpose of the agreement was to give the
surviving stockholder complete control. The purpose of the insur-
ance was to set aside a special surplus fund with which to purchase
the stock. In regard to consideration the court speaks of seals and
other mutual promises, which were likewise present in the Topken
case, but rests the case on the following statement, "While not ex-
pressly recited in the contract, we think that it is necessarily to be
inferred from its terms that the corporation bargained to pay the
premiums for the said insurance * * * the corporation did in fact
pay said premiums * * * This constituted a detriment to the cor-
poration." 20
The factual distinctions between the Topken case and the
Herschnmann case are manifold but there is only one point of distinc-
tion with regard to the law. Consideration was implied in the latter
case whereas it was not implied in the former. If such implication
was erroneous then the Herschmann case, according to the dicta of
the Topken case which it restated, was incorrectly decided for noth-
ing would remain but the illusory promise. But if the dicta in the
17 Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1st Dept. 1940).
18 Richards v. Ernst Wiener Co., 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912).
19 Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1st Dept. 1940).
20 Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 651
17 N. Y. S. (2d) 483, 485 (1st Dept. 1940).
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Topken case is erroneous also, i.e., if the corporation's promise to
purchase is not illusory, the decision in the Herschnuinn case is never-
theless correct. There would be an enforceable bilateral contract
based on mutual promises.
The inference of consideration in the Herschnunn case violates
the rule that no promise may be implied from an act where a double
motive existed for doing the act.2 ' In the words of the court "the
agreement, in order to create a fund with which to pay for the stock,
provided that the company take out life insurance policies on the
lives of both stockholders, payable to the corporation; that the pro-
ceeds of this policy were to be set apart as a special surplus account
to furnish the purchase of the stock." 22 The court points out that
the motive for and the purpose of the insurance was to secure a sur-
plus, and then infers that it was the consideration bargained for. This
is manifestly inconsistent. The Restatement of Contracts, Section 75,
says, "* * * Consideration must actually be bargained for as the ex-
change for the promise. * * * The existence or non-existence of a
bargain where something has been parted with by the promisee or re-
ceived by the promisor depends on the manifested intention of the
parties." It can hardly be said that such intention was manifested
in this case. The corporation was the beneficiary of the policy; it
paid the premiums; it could have ceased paying the premiums with-
out any liability. The deceased received no benefit from the poli6y
and he only looked to the promise as beneficial consideration. Re-
gardless of what actually may have been relied upon no promise may
be implied from an act where a double motive existed as here. The
court cannot determine without doubt whether the insurance was se-
cured as a consideration or as means to avoid the consqeuences of
Section 664. Another indication of the error is that the Court of
Appeals refused to make a similar implication in the Topken case.
If the employment therein had furnished the consideration the con-
tract would have been binding. The inference was not made though
the fact existed. Moreover, it is common practice to have repur-
chase agreements in consideration of employment; the insurance pol-
icy devise is unique.
Assuming there were sufficient grounds for the inference in the
Herschmann case, is the seller in a better position than the seller in
the Topken case? The contract is no less illusory in fact. The cor-
poration is not bound nor the seller protected to any greater degree.
The agreement to set aside the insurance money as a special surplus
21 WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) 22 ("Sec. 16. No Promise
Implied Where Double Motive Existed. * * * but where the question is whether
a promise should be implied fiom a certain act no inference of such a promise
is warranted unless the act can be explained only on that supposition.") ; Troun-
stine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. 447, 11 Pac. 441 (1886) ; White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467 (1871) ; Frankenberger v. Schneller, 258 N. Y. 270, 179 N. E. 492 (1932);
REsTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 71.
22 Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 651,
17 N. Y. S. (2d) 483, 485 (1st Dept. 1940).
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isn't valid if the capital is impaired so that creditors will be injured. 23
If the corporation was insolvent, the special surplus would vanish into
the capital assets wherein the creditors would have a prior lien on
the fund. It may be conceived that directors will issue bond or scrip
dividends, 24 or declare dividends conditioned upon and payable out
of the insurance fund, or otherwise manipulate the corporate finances
to make the special surplus unavailable. If the parties intended to
set aside the insurance fund to meet the repurchase obligation, do
they no less contemplate setting aside the regular surplus for meeting
the obligation?
Having concluded that the inference of consideration in the
Herschmann case was incorrect but that the decision was correct
nevertheless, the error of the dicta in the Topken case must be ex-
plained. That it has met with criticism 25 is some indication of its
weakness.
1. Assuming that mutuality of obligation is necessary for bi-
lateral contracts there are exceptions to the rule. Many contracts
which have an illusory characteristic analogous to the bilateral repur-
chase agreement are held to be binding.
Requirement contracts are, by the great weight of authority, en-
forced.26  Though "a seller by ceasing to manufacture may relieve
himself from any performance and still keep a promise to sell all the
goods he manufactures, and similarly a buyer by going out of busi-
ness may avoid performance while still observing the terms of an
agreement to buy all that he requires, these results can only be ob-
tained by doing something which is in-itself a legal detriment, namely
the cessation of business. Even a promise to buy or sell only so much
as the promisor chooses is a sufficient consideration when coupled
with the agreement that whatever the buyer or seller chooses to sell
or buy he will buy or sell to the promisee." 2T
The Restatement of Contracts holds the same views.28 The rea-
23 Greater N. Y. Carpet House v. Herschmann, 258 App. Div. 649, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 483 (1st Dept. 1940) (The court said: "For the reasons stated,
any claim that despite the arrangement whereby a special surplus account was
created to pay for the stock, because of the existence of other debts, there was
no corporate surplus sufficient to pay the full purchase price of the stock, would
in our opinion, constitute a defense to the present action.").2 4 
PRASEKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TioNs (1937) 754.
25 See (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 829; Note (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q. 108;
(1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 356.2 6 WHITCEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) 34, § 23; (1928) 28 COL.
L. REV. 223.
27 1 WILUISTON, CONTRACTS § 104.
28 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 2, illustration 4. "A says to B, 'I will em.-
[ VOL. 15
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soning seems to be that even though as a matter of pure logic the
condition is under the control of the promisor, yet the burden and
hardship that would be necessary to endure in order to avoid the
promise is so great that the law, recognizing the unreasonableness of
such a course of action, holds that the promise is a legal detriment.29
Is not the same reasoning applicable in regard to the require-
ment of surplus and its control? Although it may be otherwise in
small, close corporations, it can hardly be considered that directors
of large corporations with intricate financial structures, having in
mind the risk, burdens, and dangers present in business, the Penal
Law and the personal liability for misconduct, will manipulate the cor-
porate surplus to avoid a repurchase agreement. Even in the small
corporation there will ordinarily be no incentive or motive for sur-
plus manipulation.30 It seems that if a corporation has a surplus,
the stock generally will maintain its worth as treasury stock and a
monetary motive for avoidance will be absent. Likewise if the stock
is of little value so that a corporation may not deem it wise to pur-
chase, it will no doubt usually follow that the corporation will have
no surplus and of course will not have to buy. If a corporation has
made a bad contract and yet is able to perform, having a surplus,
there is no valid reason why such business units, affording so many
immunities as a method of carrying on business, should be protected
from loss.
Other exceptions to the mutuality rule are just as strikingly
analogous to the bilateral repurchase agreement as is the requirement
contract. Section 84 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts
says, "Consideration is not insufficient because of the fact * * *
sub (e) that it is a promise, and a special privilege not expressly
reserved in the promise but given by the law, makes the promise or
the whole agreement unenforceable or voidable." 31 The illustra-
tions given include the promises of infants, promises within the Stat-
ute of Frauds, and government promises. Contracts based upon such
promises have always been enforced even though the option of plead-
ing the defense of infancy, or the Statute of Frauds, or of withhold-
ing consent to be sued lies within the control of the respective prom-
ploy you for a year at a salary of $5,000 if I go into business.' This is a
promise, for although it is wholly optional with A, to go into business or not,
he does not keep his word if he goes into business without employing B."2 9 WITNEY, LAw OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) 35, § 23.
3oWisconsin Lumber Co. v. Green, 127 Iowa 350, 101 N. W. 742, 744
(1904) ("It goes without saying that the enforcement of these contracts will
take the amount paid for the repurchase of the stock out of the earnings and
assets of the company. But this is true in every case where a corporation is
permitted to repurchase its own stock. However, its stockholders' liability is
reduced by that amount, and, in the absence of fraud or a plea of insolvency on
the part of the corporation, we do not see how either the stockholders or credi-
tors are prejudiced, unless it appears that the corporation agreed to pay more
for the stock than it was worth.").
31 Accord: 1 WIUSToN, CoNTRaCrS § 105; see (1928) 28 CoT. L. REv.
1008, 1009 for examples.
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isors. The bilateral repurchase agreement is a contract of the same
specie as that of the Restatement illustrations and should fall within
the exceptions to the mutuality rule. It is based on a promise but
a special privilege not expressly reserved in the promise is neverthe-
less read into it by virtue of the interpretation of Section 664 of the
Penal Law whereby the whole agreement is unenforceable if no sur-
plus exists and the corporation proves the fact.
To make the case even stronger the tendency of the New York
courts seems to be to find a valid contract wherever possible so as
to carry out the intent of the parties.32  Thus doubtful contracts have
been said to be "instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed"
and therefore binding.33 It has been held that the very word "agree-
ment" connotes a mutual obligation. 4 When a promise can be in-
terpreted to mean either that the promisor has the arbitrary right to
avoid performance or that the performance is conditioned upon un-
avoidable contingencies, New York courts have held that the latter
construction is the one most likely to accord with the true intent of
the parties. 35
If the bilateral repurchase agreement falls within the exceptions,
the dicta in the Topken case is error and the Herschmann decision
is correct.
2. If the case does not fall within the exceptions to the rule
the case is not necessarily incorrect for there are some authorities
who doubt the existence of the mutuality of obligation rule itself.3 6
32 Ga Nun v. Palmer, 216 N. Y. 603, 610, 111 N. E. 223, 225 (1916)
("The canon of construction which prefers the meaning that will sustain rather
than one that will defeat an instrument, reinforces these conclusions.").
33 Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214 (1917); Fellows
v. Fairbanks Co., 205 App. Div. 271, 199 N. Y. Supp. 772 (4th Dept. 1923);
Meers v. Munsch-Protzmann Co., 217 App. Div. 541, 217 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1st
Dept. 1926).
34 Baldwin v. Humphrey, 44 N. Y. 609 (1871); Benedict v. Pincus, 191
N. Y. 377, 84 N. E. 284 (1908) ; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N. Y. 187,
105 N. E. 217 (1914).
35 People ex rel. New York C. & H. R. R. v. Walsh, 211 N. Y. 90, 105
N. E. 136 (1914); Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N. Y. 187, 105 N. E. 217
(1914); Meade v. Poppenberg, 167 App. Div. 411, 153 N. Y. Supp. 182 (1st
Dept. 1915) ; Sparks v. Brown, Inc., 184 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1st Dept. 1920) ;
Rice v. Miner, 89 Misc. 395, 151 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1915); News Syndicate Co.,
Inc. v. Philip Wolf, Inc., 136 Misc. 483, 241 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1930).
36 See Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Cantracts (1925) 25
COL. L. RE . 705, 723 ("When the foregoing studies have been made, we shall be
more nearly able to say whether there exists in our law this supposed rule of
mutuality. We may then find that the supposed rule is no more substantial
than the formerly supposed rule of mutuality in the law of specific performance;
that we have merely the well recognized rule of law [not equity] as to con-
siderations and actual or prospective failure of consideration [i.e., failure of
performance by the plaintiff]; that we do not have a general rule that both
parties to a bilateral contract are always subject to an action thereon or else
neither is. On the other hand, we may very well find that there is such a
general rule in the law of contracts, but, until the whole question is re-examined,
sound scholarship precludes its assertion as an established truth, much less an
[ VOL. 15
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All agree, hovever, that a dearly illusory bilateral contract is unen-
forceable, not necessarily because it lacks mutuality but because the
promisor has nothing to perform according to the terms of his prom-
ise. This would apply to unilateral contracts as well. Such promises
lack bargaining power and no reasonable man would make an ex-
change in consideration therefor. But if the promise contains some
bargaining power, no matter how small, it may be sufficient consid--
eration.3 7 A corporation's promise to repurchase must necessarily
contain some bargaining power since sellers of stock attempt to con-
tract in consideration therefor.
Another source of error is the failure to distinguish between an
illusory promise and a promise based on a condition. The latter is
sufficient consideration to support a contract 3 8 provided that the con-
dition doesn't render the promise illusory. The test as to the il-
lusory effect of the condition is whether the condition is within the
arbitrary control of the promisor,39 and not whether the event occurs
or not.40 The correct view of the repurchase agreement is that of a
contract to buy the stock in the event that a surplus exists in the
ordinary course of business at the time of payment. If the surplus
exists the corporation must purchase, if not there is no failure of
consideration. It was shown above that the surplus is not within
the arbitrary control of the corporation. Under this view the Topken
dicta is erroneous too.
3. Even on the basis that the Herschmann case is not within
the exceptions and the mutuality of obligation rule does exist, the
decision can be considered correct within the rules of unilateral con-
tracts which do not need mutuality of obligation. It is well estab-
lished that a promise which is originally too indefinite, illusory or
otherwise insufficient as consideration may become sufficient when
performed 41 or tendered,42 thus removing the deficiency. Even when
axiom."); Ballentine, Mutuality and Obligation (1914) 28 HARv. L. Ray. 121,
122, 129; supporting the rule: see Williston, The Effect of One Void Promise
in a Bilateral Agreement (1925) 25 CoL L. REV. 857.
:3 1 Wn.LsoN, CoNraACrs § 43 ("It is only where the option reserved to
the promisor is unlimited that his promise becomes illusory and incapable of
forming part of a legal obligation."); see (1928) 28 Cor- L. REv. 997; Hunt v.
Stimson, 23 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); News Syndicate Co., Inc. v.
Philip Wolf, Inc., 136 Misc. 483, 241 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1930).
'Is WyiiY, LAw OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) 98, 99, § 49; 1 WiLsTolr,
CONTRAcTs § 112.
39 RE.STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 2, Comment B.
40 Holmes, J. in Gutlon v. Marcus, 165 Mass. 335, 336, 43 N. E. 125, said,
"But, when a man acts in consideration of a conditional promise, if he gets the
promise he gets all that he is entitled to by his act, and if, as events turn out,
the condition is not satisfied, and the promise calls for no performance, there is
no failure of consideration."; Herrington v. Davitt, 220 N. Y. 162, 115 N. E.
476 (1917).
41 Gordon v. Schellhorn, 95 N. J. Eq. 563, 123 Atl. 549 (1924) ; Grossman
v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466, 100 N. E. 39 (1912); 1 WntISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 106.4 2 RZSTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 63 ("If an offer requests a promise from
1941 ]
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the seller origihally was not certain tob secure- performance, .when he
hds received or is 'fendet d in equity all that'he has bargained for he
cannot complain. -" The parties origially ihtended to, make a valid
contract' ,Since the promisor has not'with'drawn his promise,. it must
be considred in- the nattire of a continuing- offer 44 -n.and a valid' urn-
lateral cbntract arise-.on. reifeipt -of performance,4 '- It would, seem
that in illusory pr&mise plus'-.pErformanr- should make at least, as
strong a case, as one"With, b proniie,1,but wifh performance alone.
Therefore, whererthe corpoftitionrtefiders the prie, the seller not. hav-
ing disaffirmed, an enforceable unilateral codttact- arises. 'From this.
i6mtf vf~ew-the decisionlin zthe Heschmai case i9 correct- and the
dict7 in tl*, Topken -case of no f6rce.
Since the --Topken case limits -the. means of the- corporation: to.,
exercie.-Its :power to acquire its:'own::stack,. it presents ,some.rorpo--
ration probleis. ::For example; the-leeision-seems -to presume.te,
possibility of- bad:-faith on' the. part of directors in distributing the,
surplus. I.. Such a ,presumption. isnotijustified. The possibility. that
directcfs --may .anticipate -other::creditors. anM leave the corporatioii-
without assets, the stockholders being personally protected- by:the
doctrine of limted liability, has never lbeen. held to inullify-.al other
corpoiati6 n coiyitacts. Of',cburse, st n w iined' dredit&,s have remro1
edies against.:sbareholdersand di.ect.ts , .
Assuming -a repurchase agree.e aot. ,ffected by., suckh, in-,
eoquities a§. w~r, *pes,_ent in -the Tvpkq ae, has, equity. t4 ppNyjqr-
and the mitans, to enforce.-it?- Eq1ity J as .the pQ. if -it..chooses to
exercise it. The:samie-,.remedies. available -,to -creditors; %should.. be.
available to cointracting sharehqJders, the purp-.se Qf Section 58,of
the, offeree, -and- the offeree: without making-the promise actually'does or -tenders
what he was requested to promise to tio, there it -a ntract; subj ct td te rule-
stdd m Sec: 56,- provrded,-such -performance: ii "ompleted or- tendered, within
the time-allowable for-a~epting- by making a -promise. A.tender. in. such a -case
operates as . promise to render" cbmplete performance.",).- ...
• 3 W iTTrNs-LA W OFCONTRScT (3d-ed. 1937)"67,"§39; see R ESTATEMENT,
CoxiAcTs § 63, Comment. a. -- ,-, -
. 44NetheilapidsAiherican Steam Nfv. Co.-..v.'Wager,.12 F. (2d) 640; 642(C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ("Objection must be taken to a contract -which' may -be
unenforceable for lack of mutuality- before it ;has- been performed."). --
-5 Rubin v,.Dairymens,League Co-op. As'l, 284,N.; Y.-32, Z9 N. E. - (2d)
458 (1940) (The! Couft,of-,Appeals- answered the argument that "such an
exchange of promises was of. nol.egl- consequence -because it was -lacking M
mutuality" by saying, "Such anargument disregardg-the rule that, 'Even when
the .6bligation of-a unilateral- promise is 'suspended for want: of mutuality at its
inception, still, upon performance by the promisee a consideration arises which-
relates back -to the making:of the promihe. (Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y.
466, 468)"). - . ... ... ' -,
46 2 CooK, CoRp. (8th ed. 1923) § 548, N. Y. S-o'cK Coap. Lmv §§ 58,--60;-
N. Y. -PmiAL, LAw § 664. -.
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the Stock Corporation Law is to make directors compensate, for .dam,
age suffered from 'their. vrongful acts. 4" It should apply,,whenxthe
surplus is fraudulently paid, out and the -contracting shareholder Auf-
fers damage thereby. Equity can do justice to- all interests and iron
out all difficulties by allocating the proper assets to their proper
purpose.
Has equity the means and opportunity to interfere? The an-
swer is that it must have, sjnce it does interfere with corporate man-
agement in other cases. 48 The seller of the stock'before the exe.cution
of the sale is a shareholder. As such, he enjoys rights, the exercise
of which will enable,him to get the evidence and material necessary
for the court.49 All1 stock corporations are required to keep at their
officeg correct books of account of all their business arid transactions
as well as, a stock book.r° Although -there is a statutory right to in-
spect the ,stock book,51- the xight to inspect -books,.of account is still
that of the common, law 52  Furthermore, and perhaps what is most
important, is that a stockholder owning three per cent (37) of the
shares of the corporation.has the right to demand from the treasurer
a financial statement of the affairs of the corporaion.53
It seems that the "way" is present to solve this legal problem,
all that may be lacking is the "will"
-Conclusion
Jn conclusion, it might be said that, although a corporation has
the p.wer to purchase, itspown stock .subject tO the condition that itpay .therefor out 6f: s.irphis, yet it may not'bid a seller merely by
virtue of its promise' tb uy The fact, came about bl -reason of'.the
dfcta in the Topken case to the,6ffect that sudh a pr6mise was illu-
47 Stratton v. Bertles, 238 App. Div. 87, 263 N. Y. Supp.,.466 (1st.Dept.
1933) (Of the corresponding provision ii'the Stock Corporation Law of' 1892,
c. 688, § 23, it was said that it was clearly contemplated that tid capital of the
corporation should be preserved atdd, in addition to such sum, the other liabilities
provided for, before any dividend should be made by a fire insurance corpora-
tion. 1894 OP. ATrY. GEN. 212).
4s "As a general rule cou'ta hdve nothing to do with internal management
of business corporations, but, if the acts; of directors are so unjust as to be
evidence of fraud and intentional Wrong, the courts may act. They may not
compel directors to act wisely but may compel them to act honestly." Jones v.
Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 696, 246 N. Y. Supp. 204, 208
(3d Dept. 1930), Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W 668
(1919).
49 See PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS (1937) 848.50 N. Y. STOCK Co"e. LAW a 10.
51 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 113.
52 "Nothing more is required than that, acting in good faith for the protec
tion of the interests of the corporation and his own interests, he desires to
ascertain the condition of the company's business." Varney v. Baker, 194 Mass.
239i 80 N. E. 524 (1907).
03 N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 77.
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sory; the corporation being compelled to buy only if it has a sur-
plus, a fund which it controls. That in turn led to the conclusion
that the contract was a nullity lacking mutuality of obligation. How-
ever, assuming that which many doubt, s.e., that mutuality is essen-
tial, this promise is no more illusory than many analogous promises
which serve as consideration. We have for example infants' prom-
ises, promises within the statute of frauds, promises of the govern-
ment, promises to meet requirements, and promises to buy output.
All such promises bind the promisee although the~promisor may have
an option not to perform and yet escape liability Although specific
performance was properly demed in the Topken case for a lack of
equity on the plaintiff's side it becomes important to determine the
soundness of the dicta as the case of Greater New York Carpet House
v Herschnann is viewed. The holding in this case is also correct,
but the dicta in the Topken case is affirmed by the Appellate Division
and an incorrect inference of consideration is drawn so that the cor-
rect result is reached nevertheless. As matters stand there are two
correct decisions based on two doubtful opinions.
LEO SALON.
THE PLEDGING OF BANK ASSETS TO SECURE DEPOSITS. INTRA OR
ULTRA VIRES?
The insolvent condition of many banks in the last decade has
served, more frequently, to bring to the attention of the courts a
transaction whereby a bank hypothecates its liquid assets to secure
a deposit. There is a contrariety of opinion as to whether such an
act is within the authority of a bank, due mainly to the difference
of economic views in applying statutes and formulating policies. It
remains to determine the particular instances when a bank may
pledge its assets to secure deposits and, in the absence of authority,
the effect of such ultra wres acts. Any discussion of the powers of
banks must of necessity be divided into separate treatments of na-
tional banks and state banks. In view of the problem involved, there
must be a further distinction made between public and private
deposits.
State Banks
In the absence of statute, expressly stating whether a bank has
the right to pledge its assets, it becomes a question of public policy
in the determination of the zntra or ultra wres quality of such act.'
I Hellawell v. Hempstead, 10 F Supp. 771 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), Luikart v.
Aurora, 125 Neb. 263, 249 N. W 590 (1933).
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